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In the Information Age, the landscape of the battle space has undergone 
a rapid metamorphosis from the physical domain to the information 
and cognitive domains. In this transformed battle space, information 
is the unifying thread amongst various domains of warfare. Thus, the 
information domain has become an overarching domain and achieving 
information superiority an operational imperative for all battlefield 
commanders. The quest to achieve comprehensive information 
superiority across all domains has blurred the lines among various forms 
of information warfare. Electronic warfare and cyber warfare now have 
an overlapping area of Cyber and Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA). 
Such cross-domain capabilities enable kinetic as well as non-kinetic strikes 
launched from non-physical domains like the cyber domain. To defend 
against which, the strategic thinkers are already contemplating the cyber-
nuclear weapon as the new ‘mother of all weapons’. 
The recent standoff between India and Pakistan post Pulwama gave 
rise to confrontation in the physical as well as non-physical domains. 
While incidents in the physical domain were covered by the local as well 
as global media with great enthusiasm, the activities of hackers, who were 
actively supporting the operations in the physical domain, were seldom 
publicised. Under such heightened tensions, the escalation of cyber 
operations to target the nuclear weapons of the adversary may not be 
ruled out. In the past too, there were well established cyber campaigns 
in Georgia, Crimea, Estonia and Palestine, to name a few, which banked 
upon hackers to support the war effort in the physical domain. While 
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talking of the cyber-nuclear interplay, we cannot skip the ‘Stuxnet’. The 
Stuxnet was a well-planned cyber attack on Iran’s nuclear facility, possibly 
in conjunction with operations in the physical domain. A few cyber 
experts opine that the Stuxnet was a field trial of ‘hacking the bomb’.
Connecting the dots, Andrew Futter in his book Hacking the Bomb: 
Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons takes the idea further and expresses 
his serious concerns regarding the possibility of triggering/disabling a 
nuclear weapon by hacking its associated computer system which may 
have a devastating effect on a particular nation or on all of mankind. The 
concerns of the author are well placed. The book finds immense relevance 
in the present day world order, especially for nuclear capable states like 
India, wherein, even non-nuclear states and non-state actors are exploring 
cross-domain cyber-nuclear capabilities to open new vistas of warfare. 
Andrew Futter is a PhD in international relations and teaches the 
subject as Assistant Professor in the University of Leicester. He is an 
accomplished writer on nuclear technology and international relations, 
with books like Ballistic Missile Defence and Politics of Nuclear Weapons 
to his credit. This publication is the result of research work of three years 
based on secondary data which Futter has extensively quoted in his work.
The book has been methodically divided into four parts and has 
seven chapters to create a flow and build arguments. The author begins 
his narrative by referring to the 1980s’ sci-fi movie called “Wargames” 
in which a teenager hacks into the Pentagon computers which control 
nuclear weapons, and nearly starts World War III. The movie raised hackles 
all over the world and the President of the United States personally issued 
directions to mitigate such a threat. Owing to this background, Futter 
has attempted a similar sensationalism with the cyber-nuclear nexus.
Andrew Futter initially builds up a correct understanding of the nature 
of the cyber challenge in the given context. He adds that cyber should 
be viewed as an integral part of Information Warfare (IW) but we should 
also understand that it is transforming the way IW is being conducted. 
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The book then delves into the vulnerabilities of nuclear systems which 
stem from their inherent management structures and exposure to the risk 
of accidents, mistakes from complexities, and exploitation of weaknesses 
in the system by cyber operations. The vulnerabilities have further been 
enhanced by the digitisation of the Nuclear Command, Control and 
Communication (NC3) structures.
The book further leads the reader through a number of related 
incidents and their analyses to create the argument that nuclear systems 
are vulnerable to cyber nuclear espionage as state nuclear secrets are akin 
to any digital data which can be stolen remotely, lending themselves to 
exploitation. Based on the types of controls on nuclear weapons, the author 
has very innovatively divided the possible cyber attacks on nuclear systems 
as “enabling attacks” wherein an unintended launch of a nuclear missile or 
a nuclear explosion is initiated or “disabling attacks” whereby the hackers 
disable the system and prevent a missile from being launched. Futter 
then rightly builds the argument that while nuclear nation states will be 
interested in disabling their opponents’ systems it would be the non-state 
actors who would be interested in causing nuclear explosions. 
Futter is of the opinion that the future cyber-nuclear strategies will be 
defined by five dynamics: implementation of technologies to jump the air 
gap, 3D printing to challenge nuclear non-proliferation, cyber proliferation 
due to reverse engineering of attack vectors, modernisation of nuclear 
systems leading to associated vulnerabilities and unlocking of unknown 
capabilities of computers. The author, thus, concludes that given the nature 
of the future battlefield, nuclear weapons management should be simple, 
that is, devoid of any unnecessary complexity, secure from both traditional 
and digital operations and separated from other weapon systems, including 
planning processes and sensors. 
The main argument of the book is two-fold: first, the burgeoning cyber 
age is transforming the way we should think about, manage and control 
nuclear weapons; and, second, establishing a norm of hacking the bomb is a 
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bad idea fraught with danger, uncertainties and risks. Futter has successfully 
carried both arguments throughout the book and his articulations have 
been well organised and equally well supported. He has also extensively 
included statements from other seminal works which makes the reading 
lucid and interesting. Bibliographic references are a trove of information on 
the topic itself and can help to further the research. However, the absence 
of primary data on cyber attacks on sensitive infrastructure and nuclear 
systems was felt during the reading but is understandable.
In an overall assessment, Andrew Futter’s Hacking The Bomb is a well-
researched assessment which leaves the reader with valuable takeaways for 
further research. The author has assumed some state responses against cyber 
operations. The same can be verified against case studies or war-gamed to 
understand how opponents can react. It would help build policies on the 
subject. The book claims that cyber war is not possible and believes that the 
cyber challenge remains an environment or context but not a domain of 
military operations—it is a matter of interpretation and can be accordingly 
theorised. The author has also raised the issue of absence of international 
regulations for cyber attacks or threats, which can be a niche area of work 
and persuasion. Finally, while the recommendations of Futter to obviate 
the challenge largely remain confined to the cyber domain, no concrete 
recommendations have been provided for nuclear policy-makers. This 
vertical may be undertaken for further research work.
Overall, the book carries fresh ideas amidst stereotyped speculations 
of cyber war by various authors. It will be of great interest to scholars and 
students of cyber and nuclear warfare as well as defence practitioners and 
policy-makers.
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